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The paper surveys the characteristics of the common European VAT system,
proposed by the EU-Commission to overcome the weaknesses of the
transitional European VAT system, which was enacted in 1993 and is still in
force. We argue that a harmonized VAT rate will generate substantial costs
for EU member states to meet national budget requirements and that the
revenue sharing mechanisms will generate adverse incentives to national
efforts in VAT collection and control. A comparison of the Commission
proposal with four alternative VAT regimes favours a modified VIVAT system
as an attractive compromise.
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The traditional European VAT system (Cnossen/Shoup 1987, Tait 1988), laid down in the
two VAT-Directives of 1967, offers four attractive economic features:
(i)  The credit/invoice system applied to each production stage avoids the cascading
effect, which is characteristic of gross turnover taxes and which discriminates against
specialised firms in favour of vertically integrated firms
(ii)  The recouping effect ensures that final consumption bears the intended (standard,
reduced or zero rate) VAT burden, irrespective of the VAT rates, which are applied at
intermediate stages in the chain of business production. 
(iii) Zero-rating of exports in the country of origin and charging import VAT in the
country of destination ensure that these desirable properties carry over to international
transactions. All commodities and services sold to the final consumers in a country are
taxed at the same rate, whether they have been produced domestically or abroad. The
destination principle is fulfilled.
(iv) The European type VAT raises more revenue with lower administrative and economic
costs than any other broad-based consumption tax and allows the government to raise
tax revenue of roughly 0.4 per cent of GDP for every percentage point of VAT rate.
                                                
* For helpful remarks on a prior version of the paper I owe thanks to Michel Aujean (EU Commission),
Stephen Smith (University College London), Dirk Schindler (University of Konstanz) and the
participants in the Conference on Tax Policy in the European Union (October 2001, The Hague).3
Border controls have been an important corner-stone of the European VAT system, since they
provided evidence of border-crossing transactions, thus verifying the entitlement for zero-
rating upon exports as well as the obligation to pay import VAT. 
Upon completion of the single EU market in 1993 border controls between EU member
countries were abolished and the well-established border adjustment mechanisms could no
longer be operated and controlled by customs authorities. Facing this problem, the EU
Commission had launched several proposals for a modified European VAT system. The draft
directives of 1987 and 1989 did, however, not find unanimous support in the EC Council.
Finally, the Commission proposed a transitional VAT system, which was approved in a series
of directives in 1991 and 1992. The member countries changed their VAT codes and the
transitional VAT regime was implemented by January 1, 1993. This new VAT system, which
was supposed to be preliminary from the outset and which was announced to be replaced by a
definite European VAT system by 1996, deviates from the traditional European VAT system
in three aspects:
(i) The border tax adjustment procedure for commercial cross border trade between EU
member countries was changed, as national tax authorities could no longer rely on
customs authorities. Since 1993, they have to monitor the proper rebate of VAT
credits for exports to EU member countries (now intra-Community supplies) and the
proper payment of VAT on imports from EU member countries now (intra-
Community acquisitions) by checking the books of registered enterprises. This
‘deferred payment system’, however, has not been new for all EU member countries.
The Benelux countries have already been applying this mechanism successfully on
their bilateral trade since the early seventies. Deferred payment means that import
VAT is not charged at the border, but implicitly at the time of the next periodic VAT-
return, since the importing firm cannot claim a VAT credit on a VAT-free acquisition.4
(ii) Cross-border consumer purchases are no longer subject to border tax adjustment but
carry the VAT burden levied in the country of purchase. Within the single EU-market,
direct imports of households are therefore taxed according to the origin principle.
There are exemptions from this general rule, as the destination principle is still applied
for special regimes, viz. household purchases of new motor vehicles, mail ordering
and intra-community acquisitions of intermediate inputs by VAT-exempt firms.
 (iii) National VAT rate autonomy has been restricted by an EU-wide minimum standard
rate of 15 percent and a ban of VAT rates, which are higher than the standard rate.
1 
For the member states of the EU the adaptation to the European VAT system must be
regarded as a process of diminishing tax autonomy. The VAT directives of the Community
have constrained the room for the national design of a general consumption tax. Coordination
requirements have been extended in steps, the most important harmonization measure
certainly was the introduction of the present transitional system, which for the first time did
not only constrain the VAT structure but also the scope for rate differentials (minimum
standard rate, restriction of the number of reduced rates, abolition of special VAT rates on
luxuries) and VAT-administration (VAT identification numbers, VAT information exchange
system, multiple registration of companies for VAT purposes, VAT representatives). Most of
the coordination requirements of the nineties are closely related to the abolition of border
controls. As a matter of fact, the then 12 EU member countries unanimously agreed on the
restriction of their traditional VAT competences in order to complete the single market, but
they opposed to Commission proposals for further harmonization. In particular, unanimity
                                                
1  Special VAT rates on a limited group of luxuries, in particular motor vehicles, were levied in most
EU countries up to 1992 (cf. Table 3).5
could not be achieved for VAT rate bands and VAT revenue distribution through cross-border
VAT crediting plus a subsequent clearing mechanism.
The remainder of the paper deals with the future of the European VAT system. In section 2
we address problems associated with the present transitional system, which the Commission
seeks to avoid in its proposal for a common European VAT. In section 3 we argue that VAT
has become one of the two pillars of general government revenue across Europe and thus a
harmonized VAT rate is unlikely to meet national budget requirements of EU member states.
In section 4 we show that the clearing mechanisms, proposed to supplement the definitive
European VAT, generate adverse incentives to national efforts in VAT collection and control.
Section 5 considers alternatives to the Commission’s VAT proposal and compares them with
respect to the fundamental economic and political objectives for a definitive European VAT.
Section 6 evaluates harmonization requirements of various VAT proposals and favours
VIVAT as a serious candidate for a final European VAT regime. Section 7 concludes. 
2 The Commission’s Proposal for a Definitive VAT
The transitional VAT regime has been frequently criticised by the EU-Commission and, in
particular, by the German government
2. Objections against the transitional system focused on
three problems.
3
                                                
2  See, e.g. European Parliament (1995), Commission (1996), Bundesministerium der Finanzen (1994).
3  See, Commission (1996) or Smith (1997).6
(i) VAT regulations on supplies and acquisitions of firms residing in different EU
countries deviate from VAT regulations for transactions among resident firms. This
asymmetry causes non-symmetric compliance costs, which have been regarded as an
untenable violation of the concept of a genuine single market and create a “border tax
burden”, which discriminates against intra-community trade (cf. Verwaal/Cnossen
2001). 
(ii) The deferred payment system breaks the VAT chain at a very vulnerable stage, viz. at
the borderline of domestic and foreign tax administration. This weakness in VAT
control may be exploited by VAT frauds, given the fact that in the EU there is a
permanent and huge flow of commodities, which circulate free of VAT after the
export VAT rebate in the exporting country has been granted and before the deferred
VAT payment in the importing country becomes effective.
(iii) Differing national VAT rates provide incentives for price arbitrage to consumers and
for strategic VAT rate competition among EU governments, which lead to unintended
and undesirable revenue shifts between national treasuries as a consequence of
strategic undercutting of VAT rates. 
Given these shortcomings, the Commission announced a definitive VAT regime to replace the
transitory regime by 1997, but had to defer its plans after signals that unanimous support by
the member states could not be attained.
In 1996, the Commission submitted a comprehensive work programme for a common VAT
system (Commission 1996, Smith 1997, Aujean 1998), which was supposed to be
implemented by 2002. Although the EU Commission regards this proposal as a completely7
new and innovative approach, it adheres to the basic features of the draft proposals of 1987
and 1989. The common VAT system can be characterised by five basic properties: 
(i) VAT on intra-community transactions is levied according to an EU-wide
credit/invoice system. Although zero-rating of intra-community supplies is abolished,
the recouping effect prevails and consumer goods sold via retail traders are charged
according to the destination principle.
(ii) VAT liability of any firm is calculated according to the ‘single place of taxation’
principle. 
(iii) VAT revenue which is collected by national tax authorities is redistributed to the
national treasuries by a supranational apportionment of EU-wide VAT revenue
according to national account data on consumption. 
(iv) VAT bases and VAT rates are harmonised EU-wide. 
(v) National tax authorities follow standardised rules in collecting and controlling VAT
payments and are obliged to provide mutual assistance to VAT authorities of other EU
member countries. 
It becomes evident that only (ii) is a novel feature, whereas (iii) is closely related to the
macro-clearing concept of 1989 and the three others have already been key elements of the
VAT draft directive of 1987, which was rejected by the EC Council. 
The search for any definitive European VAT system faces the dilemma of two mutually
exclusive objectives, namely: 8
•  the preservation of tax autonomy in EU member states, a target which has gained
strong political support after the explicit embodiment of the subsidiarity principle in
the Maastricht treaty (now art. 5 of EC treaty), and 
•  the non-interference of commodity taxation with the fundamental economic target of
undistorted competition in the Single European Market. 
The EU Commission seems to have solved this dilemma by sacrificing VAT rate autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy, i.e. the national right to levy taxes in line with budget needs, and political
autonomy, i.e. the national right to determine the structure of tax rates in line with national
equity standards, have been ranked lower than single market objectives, at least with respect
to VAT. Although not being very clear with respect to its objectives, the EU-Commission
expects that the common VAT regime will generate gains in efficiency as well as in
international tax equity. 
While it is true that tax harmonization can act as a remedy against welfare losses of strategic
tax rate competition by avoiding a ruinous race to the bottom, it is much less clear if welfare
gains through harmonization can be earned in a world with non-symmetric countries and non-
perfect mobility of national tax bases. Within the EU efficiency requires that each country’s
government provides the welfare maximising amount of public goods, to be financed by least
distorting pattern of tax revenues. Any binding constraint on national VAT rate setting will
prevent a member country from earning the desired amount of VAT revenue, will incur
higher welfare costs of revenue collection and public good provision and will violate the
international efficiency target (Genser/Haufler 1996, Lockwood 1998). Furthermore, the
international equity target is affected, if national governments are no longer able to raise their
desirable amount of tax revenue from national tax bases because of losing the competence to
set efficient tax rates. The EU Commission, however, seems to have a different understanding9
of tax equity: equity prevails if a member country earns the amount of VAT revenue, which
the Council regards as equitable. This international equity target ignores national costs of
substituting VAT revenue gaps by less efficient third-best taxes and does it comply with the
subsidiarity principle.
3 VAT as a source of general government revenue
Since its first introduction in the six founding members of the EEC in the late sixties VAT has
become an important source of budget revenue, which is levied in 123 states across the world
by 2000 (Bird/Gendron 2001). Besides its virtues with respect to competition and foreign
trade relations, it is certainly its fiscal capacity, which has been responsible for the success
story of VAT. 
Tab. 1: VAT revenue and VAT rates in Germany
1965
a 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Revenue in bill. DM 24 38 54 93 110 155 235 250
in % of total tax revenue 16.5 17.1 14.6 16.6 15.8 16.6 17.4 17,9
in % of GDP 5.2 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.2 5.4 6.7 6.6
VAT rates
(reduced/standard)
4 5.5/11 5.5/11 6.5/13 7/14 7/14 7/15 7/16
a gross turnover tax
Source:  OECD (2000); Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2000a).
Germany was one of the first nations to introduce VAT in 1968. The importance of VAT for
the German public sector can hardly be underestimated (see Table 1). First, VAT revenue
accounts for 30% of general tax revenue (excluding social security contributions) and almost10
18% of total tax revenue (including social security contributions) in 1998. Second, the
standard rate has been raised six times in the last three decades in order to meet general
government budget requirements. Third, VAT revenue has become the fundamental source of
revenue for subfederal governments. In line with constitutional entitlements of states, VAT
revenue share of the states have been raised from 30% in the seventies to almost 50% in 2001,
and the horizontal distribution of VAT plays an important role in closing the gap between
poor and rich German states. 
Table 2: VAT revenue ratios in the EU
in percent of total tax revenue in percent of GDP
1965 1990 1998 1965 1990 1998
Austria 18.7 20.8 18.7 6.3 8.4 8.3
Belgium 21.1 16.4 15.3 6.6 7.1 7.0
Denmark 9.1 20.7 19.6 2.7 9.8 9.8
Finland 18.5 20.6 18.5 5.6 9.2 8.5
France 23.3 18.8 17.5 8.0 8.1 7.9
Germany 16.5 16.6 17.9 5.2 5,4 6.6
Greece 10.3 26.5 22.9 1.9 7.8 7.7
Ireland 5.7 20.6 22.2 1.4 6.9 7.2
Italy 12.9 14.7 14.2 3.3 5.7 6.1
Luxembourg 12.4 13.4 13.7 3.4 5.5 5.7
Netherlands 12.4 16.5 16.9 4.1 7.1 6.9
Portugal
a 8.4 19.6 23.3 1.7 5.8 8.0
Spain 22.2 16.0 16.6 3.3 5.3 5.7
Sweden 10.4 14.9 13.6 3.6 8.0 7.1
United Kingdom 5.9 17.0 18.1 1.8 6.1 6.7
EU 15 average 13.3 18.2 17.9 3.8 7.1 7.3
a Figures for 1970 instead of 1965
Source: OECD (2000).11
In other member states the fiscal importance of VAT is even higher. Table 2 shows a 25
percent increase of the VAT/GDP ratio in Germany, whereas the respective figure for the EU
15 almost doubled between the mid-sixties and the mid-nineties. In 1998, fiscal revenue from
VAT covers less than 14 percent of total tax revenue in Sweden and Luxembourg but more
than 23 percent in Portugal. The relative span of fiscal importance is even larger in relation to
GDP, ranging from 5.7 percent in Luxembourg to 9.8 percent in Denmark. Apart from fiscal
policy targets, most EU countries made use of the VAT rate autonomy in order to meet
distributional objectives by applying reduced rates to necessities and higher rates on luxuries
(see first column in Table 3). In spite of VAT rate convergence under the transitional regime,
there are still significant rate differences across EU member states revealing different fiscal
needs and distributive objectives (cf. Genser 2000). 










Austria 10 20 32 10  14 20
Belgium 0  1  6  17 19 25  33 0  6  12 21
Denmark 0 22 0 25
Finland 0  8  17 22
France 2.1  5.5  13 18.6 22 2.1  5.5 19.6
Germany 7 14 7 16
Greece 4  8 18 36 4  8 18
Ireland 0  2.3  10  12.5 21 0  4.2  12.5 21
Italy 4  9  12 19 38 0  4  10 20
Luxembourg 3  6 12 3  6  12 15
Netherlands 6 18.5 6 17.5
Portugal  0  8 17 30 5  12 17
Spain 6 12 33 4  7 16
Sweden 0 25 0  6  12 2512
United Kingdom 0 17.5 0  5 17.5
Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2000).
Given the evidence that member states are willing to use the room for VAT autonomy, there
is no doubt that the Commission proposal of a harmonized VAT rate in the Single Market will
prove harmful for most of them. Harmonizing the standard rate will not only impose a burden
by restructuring the government revenue pattern, but also affect tax incidence and thus
interpersonal redistribution. 
Table 4: Revenue gaps for a harmonized EU VAT rate of 19%

















Austria 18.7 17.7 -1.0 8.3 7.9 -0.4
Belgium 15.3 13.8 -1.5 7.0 6.3 -0.7
Denmark 19.6 14.9 -4.7 9.8 7.4 -2.4
Finland 18.5 16.0 -2.5 8.5 7.3 -1.2
France 17.5 17.0 -0.5 7.9 7.7 -0.2
Germany 17.9 21.3 +3.4 6.6 7.8 +1.2
Greece 22.9 24.2 +1.3 7.7 8.1 +0.4
Ireland 22.2 20.1 -2.1 7.2 6.5 -0.7
Italy 14.2 13.5 -0.7 6.1 5.8 0.3
Luxembourg 13.7 17.4 +3.7 5.7 7.2 +1.5
Netherlands 16.9 18.3 +1.4 6.9 7.5 +0.6
Portugal (a) 23.3 26.0 +2.7 8.0 8.9 +0.9
Spain 16.6 19.7 +3.1 5.7 6.8 +1.1
Sweden 13.6 10.3 -3.3 7.1 5.4 -1.7
United Kingdom 18.1 19.7 +1.6 6.7 7.3 +0.6
EU 15 average 17.9 17.7 -0.2 7.3 7.2 -0.1
Source: own calculation13
A harmonized European VAT rate of 19%, corresponding to the unweighted average of the
standard VAT rates in 2000 would create a revenue shortfall of 4.7 percent in Denmark and a
revenue surplus of 3.7 percent in Luxembourg (see Table 4). Since member states would not
only have to bear the costs for the redistribution of EU-wide VAT revenue, but also
adjustment costs, if they are forced to accommodate to an EU rate which is higher or lower
than their optimal national VAT rate, there seems to be little hope that these costs can be
outweighed by “efficiency gains” under the new European VAT regime. 
4 Incentive effects of clearing
Switching from export zero-rating to international VAT credits implies that VAT revenue
charged on intra-Community supplies remains in the exporting country, whereas importing
countries lose exactly the same amount of VAT revenue by matching VAT credit claims on
intra-Community acquisitions. The Commission intends to compensate these revenue shifts
between member countries and has made several proposals for a clearing mechanism.
While the 1987 directive suggested a system of micro-clearing, based on business documents
of intra-Community transactions, the 1989 directive proposed a system of macro-clearing,
based on national accounts data on intra-Community trade and aggregate consumption. Both
clearing models were criticised as complex, non-transparent and costly and these arguments
have to be regarded as major impediments against an approval of the respective draft
directives in the Council. The Commission’s common VAT proposal of 1996 expands the
macro-clearing mechanism to aggregate VAT revenue in the Community. It requires that
VAT revenue flows to a supra-national tax authority first and is redistributed to national fiscs
according to well defined macroeconomic consumption figures in a second step. This type of14
revenue sharing is well known in federal states (Germany, Austria, Australia), where shares
of (joint) federal taxes are distributed to subfederal fiscs according to negotiated quotas which
give rise to permanent political dispute. 
The ultimate objective of VAT-clearing is the distribution of VAT revenue across member
states according to final consumption, paying attention to the understanding that VAT is a
consumption tax rather than a production tax. Even if micro- and macro-clearing are based on
consistent consumption data, and if operating and data collection costs are neglected, the two
clearing mechanisms are not economically equivalent, since they generate different economic
incentive patterns. Unfortunately both clearing methods suffer from adverse incentives, which
tend to erode national efforts to collect and control VAT properly and jeopardise efficiency
gains from a common VAT system which relies on clearing. 
4.1 Incentive effects of macro-clearing
Under a macro-clearing regime, each national government receives a certain share of
European VAT revenue. The share is determined by national account figures, which are
checked and published by the European Statistical Office. Under a macro clearing regime
Dutch VAT revenue depends on the Dutch consumption share as well as on total European
VAT revenue. The amount of Dutch VAT revenue will be higher, if efforts in tax
administration and control prevent revenue losses through sloppiness and fraud in all member
countries. 
Even under a macro-clearing regime, VAT administration will remain the business of national
tax authorities. Since higher efforts incur higher costs, the choice of the optimal effort level is
an economic problem. For the national government, it will pay to invest an additional Euro in15
tax collection effort, as long as national tax revenue will rise by one Euro or more. While this
incentive to provide an efficient effort level works, if additional tax revenue flows back to the
national budget, European revenue sharing creates a positive fiscal externality setting and
rational governments will undersupply tax collection efforts. 
Let B be the net benefit from investment in VAT collection efforts for member state i (e.g. the
Netherlands) 
(1) B(VATi) = αiVAT – we(VATi)
where  αi  is the consumption based revenue share of member state i, which is assumed
invariant with respect to marginal changes of the effort level. VATi is VAT revenue collected
in state i, VAT = ΣVATj is total European VAT revenue. Variable w is the unit cost of tax
collection effort, and e(VATi) is a monotonically increasing and strictly convex effort
function, i.e. e’(VATi) > 0 and e’’(VATi) > 0. Maximising (1) leads to the first order
condition
(2) dB/dVATi = αi – w de/dVATi = 0 
The efficient effort level ei for member state i is characterized by
(3) e’(VATi) = αi/w 
For the European Union as a whole, the efficient effort level for state i, e*i, is determined by
maximising the aggregate benefit level B
t from VAT revenue, irrespective whether it remains
in state i or whether it is allocated to another member state, viz. 
(4) B
t(VATi) = VATi – we(VATi) 
The first order condition now is16
(5) dB
t/dVATi = 1 – w de/dVATi = 0 
and e*i is characterized by 
(6) e’(VATi) = 1/w > αi/w
Since marginal effort is monotonically increasing, this implies e*i > ei. Effort levels in VAT
collection will be inefficiently low, unless the positive fiscal externalities of national VAT
collection are fully internalised. Ceteris paribus, the effort gap and the revenue shortfall will
be the higher, the smaller is αi, the percentage share of an additional unit of VAT, which
flows to state i. 
If the Dutch VAT administration were able to collect a marginal revenue increment of 100
Euro, then consumption-based macro-clearing would raise Dutch VAT revenue only by 4
Euro. The VAT share is even below 4% for the nine member states, which are smaller than
the Netherlands. Thus macro-clearing provides incentives for low effort levels in VAT
administration and lax VAT control in all member states. Resultant welfare losses could only
be overcome if agreements on efficient VAT administration were enforceable in all member
countries.
4.2 Incentive effects of micro-clearing
Under a micro-clearing scheme, each national fisc transfers VAT revenue charged on intra-
Community supplies to the clearing house but is entitled to claim refund for VAT credits
granted on intra-community acquisitions. The clearing-house breaks even, if inflows and
outflows are based on the complete set of trade documents. But as long as the clearing-house
is supposed to rely on independent trade figures submitted by national VAT authorities, there
are consolidation problems, since for each taxable intra-Community transaction VAT17
payment and the corresponding VAT credit are documented in separate VAT returns and in
separate national trade statistics. Whenever the clearing house has to rely on summary
statistics, it is not able to trace back taxable transactions to firms in single countries. Given
this information asymmetry, there is an incentive for member countries to monitor carefully
proper VAT payment on intra-Community supplies, which increases national VAT revenue,
whereas it hardly pays to invest in efforts on monitoring credit claims. As VAT credit claims
are fully refunded by the clearing house, marginal returns on monitoring efforts are likely to
be negative. Undersupply of monitoring efforts on VAT credit claims will generate deficits in
the clearing house balances, which have to be covered by all member states, and welfare
losses. Again enforceable agreements on efficient VAT administration would be necessary
throughout the EU. 
5 Alternative approaches for a common European VAT system
In face of the problems attributed to the transitional VAT system raised in section 2 and the
weaknesses of the Commission’s common VAT proposal addressed in the two previous
sections, we can set up a list of four desiderata, which might be used as a litmus test for VAT
proposals. A promising European VAT regime can be characterized by 
(1)  avoidance of compliance asymmetry 
(2)  avoidance of zero-rating of intra-Community supplies
(3)  adherence to national VAT rate autonomy
(4)  incentive compatible VAT administration at the national level18
Evidently, the transitional system as well as the Commission proposals violate one or more of
these requirements (see Table 5). 
We therefore extend the evaluation of VAT regimes by four others, which have recently been
discussed in academic journals. Three of them deviate from the Commission proposal by
extending the VAT rate structure and require the application of different non-zero VAT rates
to taxable transactions. 
Keen/Smith (1996, 2000) proposed VIVAT, a viable integrated VAT regime, which applies a
two-tier VAT. The first of these two VAT-rates is harmonized across the EU, the “Euro-
VAT” is charged on all taxable transactions at the same rate in all 15 member countries. The
second VAT is a national retail sales tax, which is levied on sales to final consumers (and
non-registered firms). The retail sales VAT rate is at the discretion of each member country.
Registered firms can claim Euro-VAT credits on intra-Community acquisitions which exclude
cascading. Final consumers pay an aggregate VAT burden consisting of the Euro-VAT and
the retail sales VAT in the country of purchase. Apart from cross-border shopping the
residence principle prevails. 
Bird/Gendron (1998, 2000, 2001) recommended the Canadian dual VAT as a blueprint for the
definitive VAT regime. For the EU this proposal would require a supra-national European
VAT, applied to all taxable transactions, and an autonomous national VAT, which is applied
to domestic sales only, since intra-Community supplies are zero-rated. For final consumers
the “dual VAT regime” is equivalent to VIVAT, only registered domestic firms have to
handle VAT credit claims on both the supra-national VAT and the national VAT.
McLure (2000) advocated a CVAT regime (compensating VAT), which is based on a VAT
proposal for the Brazilian federation (Varsano 1995). Under a European CVAT in each19
member state sales to domestic customers (registered firms and final consumers) would be
charged at the national VAT rate, whereas sales to non-domestic customers are subject to
CVAT, which is levied at the same rate in all member countries. Registered firms can claim
VAT credits for national VAT and for supra-national CVAT, paid on their domestic or intra-
Community purchases of intermediate inputs. 
While both, the dual VAT regime and the CVAT regime start out from a supra-national VAT,
which does not exist in the EU, the proposals are nevertheless applicable, since supra-national
VAT revenue need not flow to the EU budget, but can be redistributed immediately to the
member states. In this respect both proposals are similar to the Commission’s common VAT
regime, although revenue clearing is restricted to the supra-national VAT component,
whereas national VAT immediately feeds national fiscs.
Table 5: Comparison of VAT proposals for the EU Single Market










zero yes no yes
Draft directives
1987/89
country of supply yes yes no
Definitive VAT
(Commission 1996)






















A fourth proposal, due to Vanistendael (1995), requires registered firms to charge VAT on
taxable transactions at the rates of their customers’ residence. In addition, VAT revenue from
no-domestic clients has to be transferred immediately to the tax authorities of the clients’
countries of residence. Basically, this regime extends the current special regime for mail
ordering to all taxable transactions. 
In Table 5 we present an evaluation of these additional proposals based on the four desiderata
developed above. The result of this comparison is that VIVAT proves to be the only regime,
which treats domestic and intra-community supplies alike, leaves room for tax autonomy,
avoids the problems of zero-rating of intra-Community supplies and provides incentives for
decentralized VAT administration. 
This favourable result does, however, not indicate an undisputable superiority of the VIVAT
regime over its competitors. The evaluation is based on a set of criteria, which might be
regarded selective and incomplete. Cnossen (1998) argues in favour of the transitional
system, indicating that compliance symmetry is not a very important desideratum for him. On
the other hand he recognizes the problem of tax fraud which in his view should be tackled by
improving monitoring facilities for VAT administration, in particular by introducing unified
VAT documents which can be checked by tax authorities in the origin and in the destination
country. Furthermore, some Table 5 desiderata will be less important if the focus is not the
EU but a tax union of developing or transformation countries. In such a tax union problems of
incentive compatibility might be of second order, since some member countries will not be
able to administer VAT efficiently but will have to rely on a newly established supranational
authority. Finally, the importance of compliance symmetry fades, if experience in VAT
compliance and control is poor in a developing country, and identification of clients is
required anyway (see Keen/Smith 2000, 744ff.). 21
6 The coordination requirements for alternative VAT regimes 
Although EU member countries were forced to respect a series of VAT directives under the
traditional European VAT regime, harmonization requirements were regarded low. Once the
credit/invoice type, destination-based VAT system was adopted, member states only had the
obligation to zero-rate exports and to charge proper national VAT rates on imports in a
transparent and non-discriminatory way. Most EU members applied border-controls to
implement the border-adjustment process, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands,
however, applied the deferred payment system on bilateral trade flows. Member countries
were not only free to levy VAT rates according to national policy objectives, to decide upon
national regulations of VAT compliance, VAT payment and VAT control, they were also able
to use considerable room with respect to the determination of national VAT bases.
Harmonization requirements, laid down in the 6
th VAT Directive, did not force member states
to change their VAT bases. The directive rather defined the benchmark for an aggregate
national VAT base, which enabled the Commission to calculate proper shares for the VAT-
related contributions of EU member states to the EU-budget. 
The transitional system upheld most of the attractive features of the traditional VAT regime,
apart from additional information requirements to replace former border documents. VAT
identification numbers were introduced to identify registered businesses from other member
countries, which qualify for zero-rating, and firms were obliged to provide additional
information on trade with other member countries in order to increase the probability of
detecting VAT fraud, in particular through diverting zero-rated intra-Community supplies to
final consumers without paying VAT. The abolition of border controls also opens the door to
consumer price arbitrage through cross-border shopping in low VAT countries. Although the22
introduction of the minimum standard rate and the abolition of increased VAT rates have
been motivated by curbing cross-border shopping and incentives for strategic VAT rate
undercutting, we keep aside this kind of VAT rate harmonization in the following for two
reasons. First, we consider cross-border shopping as a specific phenomenon, which occurs
under all regimes without border controls. Second, we acknowledge empirical evidence that
cross-border shopping is a local phenomenon, which has only limited effects on trade flows
and national VAT revenue. 
The common VAT system of the Commission, however, implies a far higher degree of
harmonization, viz. on tax bases, tax rates, measures for revenue sharing and VAT control.
VAT-base harmonization is required in order to extend the credit/invoice principle to intra-
Community transactions. Rate harmonization is desirable to curb strategic VAT competition
and to facilitate clearing. Harmonized national account principles are necessary in order to
assign VAT revenue in line with final consumption. Harmonized VAT control is unavoidable
to overcome the disincentive effects in favour of lax VAT administration at the national level. 
A condensed summary of the coordination requirements of the traditional and the transitional
VAT regimes as well as the Commission proposals of 1987/89 and 1996 is given in the four
upper rows of Table 6. In the four lower rows we extend the evaluation of harmonization
requirements to the four alternative VAT regimes introduced in Table 5.
Tax base harmonization is an element of all four VAT regimes, although national VAT bases
may deviate from the harmonized Community VAT base under a dual VAT. 
VAT rate harmonization is required for the three two-tier VATs, which apply a harmonized
Euro-VAT (VIVAT, dual VAT, CVAT). But opposite to the Commission proposal rate23
harmonization under these regimes leaves room for marginal variations of national VAT
revenue through the second tier. In Table 6 we capture this lower degree of harmonization by
a “partial” entry in column 3, which is further explained by remarks in brackets.
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The larger the VAT share, which has to be redistributed by a clearing mechanism, the more
attention has to be devoted to the revenue sharing scheme and to efficient VAT control. A
European CVAT or dual VAT regime will generate supranational VAT revenue, which by far
exceeds the budget requirement of the EU and therefore has to be redistributed to the national
fiscs. The protagonists of these regimes do not address this redistribution issue explicitly, but
basically both regimes require a revenue sharing mechanism in analogy to the common
European VAT. Under a prepaid destination VAT regime, revenue collected in the origin
state has to be remitted to the destination state according to a micro-clearing mechanism.24
Under a VIVAT regime Euro-VAT revenue on intra-Community supplies remains in the
origin state rather than in the destination state. But as intra-Community trade is subject to a
single tax rate, the clearing volume of a member country shrinks to a relatively low level, viz.
VAT on the country’s multilateral trade balance with the rest of the EU members
4. In Table 6
we capture this property by a “low” entry for VIVAT in column 4. 
Problems with efficient VAT control arise, whenever higher efforts in VAT administration
create substantial positive externalities in other member countries. With respect to our VAT
regimes harmonization of VAT control is necessary, because national incentives are
insufficient to avoid tax fraud in neighbour states or to control proper VAT compliance. In
column 5 of Table 6 we mark the reason for harmonization in VAT control in brackets and
add a “low” entry for VIVAT because of the lower clearing volume. 
A comparison of all the alternatives offers evidence that coordination requirements for the
transitional system and for VIVAT are lower than for all the other VAT regimes. On the one
hand, Table 6 rationalizes the approval of the transitional VAT system in the early nineties,
since it requires less harmonization than the alternative VAT proposals. On the other hand,
the three low entries for VIVAT reveal that it may be worthwhile for the Commission to have
a closer look at this VAT regime as an option to overcome the present deadlock situation. 
                                                
4  This is one of the reasons why the Commission favoured a VAT rate harmonization across Europe,
because then cross-border VAT crediting will only shift VAT revenue between member states with
respect to aggregated trade imbalances with all other EU member countries, rather than with respect to
VAT rate differentials and bilateral trade imbalances.25
6.1  Further room for autonomy in tax policy and tax administration
Although coordination requirements are regarded low under a VIVAT regime, they can even
be further reduced if the clearing mechanism is discarded. While national VAT revenue
without clearing (consisting of revenue from Euro-VAT and national retail sales VAT) will
deviate from the VAT revenue benchmark of the transitional regime, if there is a net intra-
Community supply or acquisition surplus in trade between registered firms, VIVAT also
offers the opportunity to close this revenue gain or revenue loss by a variation of the national
retail sales VAT rate. 
While the VIVAT proposal of Keen/Smith (1996) is based on a single VAT rate in each
member country (consisting of the harmonized VAT rate on business trade plus the national
retail sales VAT), there is nevertheless room for national distribution policy since national
retail sales VAT could well be operated with more than one national VAT rate. Even negative
sales tax rates on necessities are conceivable, although politicians might be well advised to
offer a consumer expenditure relief through a personal VAT subsidy rather than through
reduced VAT rates. 
The necessity for a harmonized treatment of small businesses becomes less urgent, since VAT
relief can be granted through retail sales VAT exemption, a measure which can be chosen
autonomously by national parliaments.
Although two independent and different VATs have to be administered there are hardly any
additional compliance and control costs, if the VAT base for both VATs is the same. The
retail sales VAT then can be regarded as a split rate system with a VAT rate of zero to
registered firms. 26
Finally, VIVAT need not be restricted to retail sales VAT rates, which are the same across the
whole member country. Within the VIVAT regime there should be room for regionally
differing retail sales VAT rates, e.g. in the different provinces of a member country. Such a
variation might be desirable to cover different fiscal needs, to increase fiscal responsibility of
subfederal governments, or to cope with strategic sales tax competition in border regions. 
7 Conclusion
Although the EU member states have learned to live with the present VAT regime for almost
one decennium, the Commission does not want to reform the transitional VAT system but to
replace it by a new final VAT regime. The common European VAT regime proposed by the
Commission is able to avoid certain problems of VAT fraud, of compliance-based trade
discrimination and of undesirable VAT revenue shifts. But it also generates a considerable
loss of national VAT autonomy, introduces a new supranational mechanism of revenue
sharing and requires harmonized VAT administration in the member states. 
Since it is still not very likely that the Commission will find unanimous support for its
common European VAT proposal, VIVAT should become a viable compromise. First,
VIVAT respects two major desiderata of the Commission for the final European VAT system,
viz. abolishment of zero-rated intra-Community supplies and compliance symmetry. Second,
VIVAT respects fiscal VAT autonomy and incentive compatible VAT administration in line
with the principle of subsidiarity Third, the “single place of taxation”-rule, which the
Commission regards as a vital, simplifying element of the final VAT system, may be operated
under VIVAT as under any other VAT regime. Fourth, EU member states, which are reluctant
to support the Commission proposal, should be less opposed to VIVAT, which keeps fiscal27
VAT autonomy and requires less harmonization. Fifth, critics of VIVAT should recognize
that the two-tier VAT structure generates a coherent VAT regime, which reconciles the
conflict between fiscal subsidiarity and undistorted competition in the single European
market, and that different VAT rates to registered firms and to final consumers are neither
discriminating nor costly.
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